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1.  Introduction 
 
The semantics of attitude verbs (believe, deny, etc.) and indirect discourse verbs 
(say, state, etc.) has long been an important topic for philosophy of language and 
natural language semantics. The point made by Frege (1892) remains valid to this 
day, which is that an attitude verb creates an intensional context in that the 
semantic contribution made by its sentential complement cannot be its denotation 
(i.e., a truth value). Nevertheless, It is not easy to pinpoint precisely the semantic 
contribution of the complement clause. Let us first consider several different ways 
of formalizing the semantics of attitude verbs. The truth conditions for (1) could 
be formalized in various ways as shown in (2a-d). Throughout this paper, w0 and 
t0 represent the actual world and the utterance time, respectively. 
 
(1)  John believes that Mary is pregnant. 
(2)  a.  Hintikka (1969): (1) is true in w0 iff {w | w is not precluded by John’s 
belief in w0} ⊆ {w | Mary is pregnant in w}  
  b.  Hintikka (1969) with an ontology containing times: (1) is true at t0 in 
w0 iff {w | w is not precluded by what John believes at t0 in w0} ⊆ {w 
| Mary is pregnant at t0 in w} 
  c.  Montague (1973): (1) is true at t0 in w0 iff {<w,t>| <w, t> is not 
precluded by what John’s belief at t0 in w0}  ⊆ {<w,t> | Mary is 
pregnant at t in w} 
  d.  Lewis (1979): (1) is true at t0 in w0 iff {<x,w,t>| <x,w,t> is a doxastic 
alternative of John at t0 in w0} ⊆ {<x, w,t> | Mary is pregnant at t in 
w} 
 
If we assume that a proposition is a set of worlds and ignore times completely, 
then the truth conditions for (1) would be analyzed as in (2a) à la Hintikka (1969). 
Put informally, a sentence of the form “α believes p” is true iff every world that is 
not precluded by what α believes is where p is true (i.e., is an element of the 
intension of p). In this characterization, a proposition is (the characteristic 
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function of) the set of worlds in which the sentence in question is true. If we 
introduce times and still subscribe to the view that a proposition is a set of worlds, 
then we obtain the truth conditions given in (2b), where the time of Mary’s being 
pregnant is specified as t0. 
Montague (1973) reinterprets the concept of proposition as (the 
characteristic function of) a set of world-time pairs rather than as (the 
characteristic function of) a set of worlds. This translates into a different semantic 
analysis of attitude verbs. In Montague’s account, an attitude verb denotes a 
relation between individuals and sets of world-time pairs. More specifically, (1) is 
true iff every world-time pair not precluded by α’s belief at the utterance time in 
the actual world is where p is true. Put another way, {<w,t> | <w,t> not precluded 
by α’s belief at the utterance time in the real world} is required to be a subset of 
{<w,t>| p is true at t in w} as shown in (2c). Regarding (1) we can say that every 
world-time pair not precluded by what John believes at the utterance time in the 
actual world is a world-time pair at which Mary is pregnant. This approach is 
arguably more flexible than Hintikka’s approach, and this point will be elaborated 
below. 
Lastly, (2d) describes Lewis’s (1979) analysis of attitude verbs. This 
analysis essentially treats an attitude verb as involving a relation between 
individuals and properties, where properties are sets of individual-world-time 
triples. Accordingly the truth conditions for (1) are given as in (2d). As far as (1) 
is concerned, introducing a property rather than a proposition in (2d) seems 
superfluous because no individual variable is bound in specifying the property 
here. However, when we turn to more complex examples, the strength of Lewis’s 
proposal becomes apparent. Consider Perry’s (1977) well-known example in (3a) 
regarding this issue.  
 
(3)  a.  Heimson believes that he is Hume. 
  b.  Heimson believes that he is Napoleon. 
 
Heimson, who is insane, believes himself to be Hume. On the other hand, 
Heimson, though he may be insane, does not believe that he is Napoleon. Given 
this scenario, (3a) is true but (3b) is false. This would be a problem if believe 
denotes a relation between individuals and propositions (regardless of whether a 
proposition is a function from worlds into truth values or a function from world-
time pairs into truth values). (3a) and (3b) share the same subject (i.e., Heimson), 
and both Heimson is Hume and Heimson is Napoleon are necessary false 
propositions equivalent to the empty set. One therefore would have to conclude 
that (3a) and (3b) are truth-conditionally equivalent. This is an undesirable 
prediction. 
Lewis’s (1979) account, which involves relations between individuals and 
properties, provides a solution to this problem. According to this approach the 
truth conditions for (3a) are given as in (4a), whereas the truth conditions for (3b) 
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are specified as in (4b).  
 
(4)  a.  (3a) is true at t0 in w0 iff {<x,w,t> | <x,w,t> is a doxastic alternative of 
Heimson at t0 in w0} ⊆ {<x,w,t> | x is Hume at t in w} 
  b.  (3b) is true at t0 in w0 iff {<x,w,t> | <x,w,t> is a doxastic alternative of 
Heimson at t0 in w0} ⊆ {<x,w,t> | x is Napoleon at t in w} 
 
Intuitively, Lewis’ account enables us to talk about attitudes as self-ascription of 
properties. Such beliefs are referred to as de se beliefs after Lewis and the 
pronoun he in (3a) or (3b) is often referred to as a de se pronoun. 
Under Lewis’s analysis, (3a) is now understood to mean that Heimson 
self-ascribes the property {<w,t,x> | x is Hume at t in w}. That is, the pronoun he 
is understood to be a bound variable. Since the property {<w,t,x> | x is Hume at t 
in w} is distinct from the property {<w,t,x> | x is Napoleon at t in w}, Lewis’s 
analysis enables (3a) and (3b) to have different truth values. This is empirically 
correct. However, it is not clear how to derive a property (rather than a 
proposition) from the complement clause he is Hume in (3a). In other words, the 
question is how to force the pronoun he to be bound by a binder in a 
compositional manner. 
Schlenker (1999, 2003) proposes a system in which attitude verbs are 
semantically analyzed in a way substantially different from the aforementioned 
approaches. He contends that an attitude verb is a “monster” in the sense of 
Kaplan (1977/1989). Kaplan (1977/1989) proposes a system for semantics which 
involves three levels: character, content (intension), and extension. This system 
enables Kaplan to account for the characteristics of so-called indexical 
expressions such as I, you, now, here, etc. whose denotations are fixed in relation 
to the utterance context. According to Kaplan’s proposal, indexical expressions 
have contents that are context-dependent. Non-indexicals are in turn defined as 
those expressions whose extensions depend upon evaluation worlds/times. This 
proposal about natural language semantics enables us to distinguish between 
expressions whose meanings depend upon contexts (i.e. indexicals) and those 
with meanings that depend upon worlds (or world-time pairs). More concretely, 
indexicals such as I and you have constant characters but variable contents 
(depending upon the context). Kaplan denies the existence of monsters, which are 
operators that manipulate contexts. Schlenker (1999, 2003) disagrees with Kaplan 
and argues that attitude verbs are “monsters” in that they denote relations between 
individuals and contexts. This is technically and conceptually distinct from the 
more traditional views about attitudes presented in (2). 
Schlenker’s idea that attitude verbs are monsters stems from the fact that 
in some languages indexicals can occur in verb complement clauses and produce 
interpretations which indicate what we might call “relative interpretations”. What 
is a “relative interpretation” of an indexical? An indexical is used under normal 
circumstances to refer to an object definable only in relation to the utterance 
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context. For example, in English I refers to the speaker of the utterance context; 
now refers to the time of the utterance context. We might refer to these standard 
uses of indexicals as “absolute interpretations”. Schlenker observes that in some 
languages (including Amharic) indexicals are interpreted in verb complement 
clauses in relation to the context of the reported attitude, not in relation to the 
utterance context. I will use the term “relative interpretation” to refer to this usage 
of indexicals because it is similar to the way in which the Japanese present tense 
(understood to be a relative tense (Ogihara 1996)) is used in verb complement 
clauses. 
In Amharic, the first person pronoun ‘I’ can occur in the embedded clause 
to indicate the speaker of the attitude context. This is shown in (5a). The first 
person pronoun ‘I’ occurs in (5a) to indicate the agent of the reported speech act, 
namely John. Schlenker denies the possibility that the embedded clause is a 
quoted sentence by citing examples like (5b), where the embedded clause has 
both the subject ‘I’ and the object ‘me’. If it were a direct quote, it would mean 
that ‘he’ will not obey ‘himself’, but it actually means that ‘he’ will not obey ‘me’ 
(the speaker of the entire sentence). Thus, the clause cannot be a direct quote. 
Schlenker represents the semantics of attitude verbs as in (6). The basic idea is 
clear here. An attitude verb is analyzed as a quantifier over a set of contexts: those 
contexts that could be the context of the attitude. 
 
(5)  a.  john Jgna naNN yt-lall 
   John  hero  I-am   says-3rd sg.m 
    ‘John says that he is a hero.’ 
 b.  al∂ttazzäzäNN            alä. 
   I-will-not-obey-me  he-said 
    ‘He said that he will not obey me.’ (or ‘He refused to obey me.’) 
 
(6)  Schlenker’s semantics of attitude verbs: A sentence of the form “John 
believes S” uttered at t0 in w0 is true iff {c | c (context) is compatible with 
what John believes at t0 in w0}  ⊆ {c | ‘I am a hero’ is true in c} 
(paraphrasing Schlenker 2003: 73) 
 
In the rest of this paper, I will present some problems with Schlenker’s approach, 
and propose an alternative that is empirically and conceptually more desirable. In 
essence, my proposal defends Lewis’s proposal for the relevant data drawn from 
Japanese and Amharic. To the extent that my proposal is couched in Lewis’s 
property-based approach to the semantics attitudes, it is very similar to von 
Stechow’s (2003). The main difference is that I account for the occurrences of 
“relative indexicals” by assimilating them to relative tenses in Japanese, whereas 
von Stechow attempts to explain their behavior in terms of feature checking and 
deletion mechanisms.  
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2.  Problems with the Monster-based Approach 
 
As mentioned in Section 1, Schlenker’s claim about attitude verbs is that they are 
monsters in the sense of Kaplan and are quantifiers over contexts. I argue with 
von Stechow (2003) that even though the data that Schlenker discusses are 
important for the semantics of attitude verbs, this conclusion is not warranted. 
Like von Stechow (2003), I contend that Lewis’s analysis of attitudes in terms of 
relations between individuals and properties successfully accounts for the 
behavior of quasi-indexicals (Schlenker’s terminology) in verb complement 
clauses. By assuming that the object of an attitude is a property, the information 
about the attitude context can be transmitted indirectly via the bound individual 
variable since the property is self-ascribed to the attitude holder, who is in the 
center of the reported context. For example, (7a) (=5a) would be understood to 
have the truth conditions given in (7b), where the first person pronoun ‘I’ 
corresponds to the bound individual variable x. This is sufficient to show that the 
embedded ‘I’ is understood to be the holder of the attitude being reported, namely 
John. 
 
(7)  a.  john Jgna naNN yt-lall 
   John  hero  I-am   says-3rd sg.m 
    ‘John says that he is a hero.’ 
  b.  {<x,w,t> | <x,w,t> is a doxastic alternative of John at t0 in w0} ⊆ 
{<x,w,t> | x is a hero at t in w} 
   Informally: 
    John talks at t0 in w0 as if he self-ascribes the following property: 
{<x,w,t> | x is a hero at t in w} 
 
The main difference between my proposal and von Stechow’s resides in how the 
lexical semantics of the Amharic ‘I’ is given. I assume that the Amharic ‘I’ is an 
individual variable that is necessarily bound by the individual variable binder and 
is not exactly a first person indexical. Von Stechow, on the other hand, assumes 
that the Amharic ‘I’ is a regular first person indexical pronoun. When it occurs in 
a verb complement clause, its feature is deleted and it is interpreted as a bound 
variable. 
Schlenker’s proposal also suffers from a conceptual problem, which may 
develop into a technical problem as well. Under Schlenker’s analysis, it seems 
natural to assume that all indexicals (including ‘here’, ‘you’, ‘yesterday’, 
‘tomorrow’, ‘now’, etc.) that occur in complement clauses receive “relative” 
interpretations. This is not attested in the world’s languages. There does not seem 
to be a language where all occurrences of all indexicals receive relative 
interpretations. In fact, Schlenker openly acknowledges that some sentences in 
Amharic are multiply ambiguous because the indexical expressions can be 
interpreted either in relation to the utterance context (absolutely) or the reported 
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attitude context (relatively). Here is one example cited by Schlenker (1999: 36). 
 
(8) m∂n ∂wädalläxw  ∂ndaläalsämac∂m 
  what I-like that-he-said  she-didn’t-hear 
  ‘She didn’t hear what he said he liked’ or ‘She didn’t hear what he said I 
liked’ 
 
In one of the examples Schlenker cites (i.e. 5b repeated here as 9), the first person 
pronoun occurs twice, as the subject ‘I’ and as the object ‘me’. This example is 
used by Schlenker to show that the complement clause is not a direct quote. His 
point is clear. However, this example also reveals a problem with his approach 
because it is not clear why it is possible for the two occurrences of the pronoun ‘I’ 
in (9) to be interpreted in two different ways: one in relation to the embedded 
context, the other in relation to the utterance context. This shows that only some 
occurrences of some indexicals are interpreted in relation to embedded contexts 
and casts doubt upon the predictive ability of the system Schlenker proposes. 
 
(9) al∂ttazzäzäNN            alä. 
  I-will-not-obey-me  he-said 
  ‘He said that he will not obey me.’ (or ‘He refused to obey me.’) 
 
Schlenker says that as long as some indexicals receive relative interpretations, we 
need a monster-based approach. But as shown above, Lewis’s property-based 
approach gives us all the machinery we need to account for the behavior of such 
indexicals. 
Regarding tense, Schlenker’s proposal accounts for the fact that in 
languages like Russian the simple present tense behaves like a relative tense in 
verb complement clauses but not in relative clauses. (10a) shows that the Russian 
present behaves like a relative past in a verb complement clause. On the other 
hand, (10b) involves a relative clause and shows that a present tense can only be 
interpreted absolutely (i.e., in relation to the utterance time) (Schlenker 2003: 70). 
 
(10) a.  petjai skazal, čto oni plačet 
   Pejtai said    that hei is-crying 
    ‘Petja said that he was crying [at the time of his utterance].’ 
 b.  petjai vstretil čeloveka, kotoryj plačet. 
    Petja met a person who is crying/cries.’ 
 
Schlenker’s proposal explains the difference between (10a) and (10b) in terms of 
the presence of quantification over contexts (or lack thereof). The present tense 
morpheme in (10a) is capable of receiving a relative interpretation because the 
attitude verb forces us to consider times that are associated with the reported 
attitude (i.e., ‘say’). Since the context is not shifted by an operator in (10b), the 
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present tense morpheme is interpreted in relation to the utterance time. 
Unfortunately, as shown in Ogihara (1996), Japanese tense morphemes 
can receive relative interpretations in both verb complements and relative clauses, 
except that in relative clauses tenses have the option of receiving absolute 
interpretations. Consider the examples (11a, b). 
 
(11)  a.  Taroo-wa [Hanako-ga     byooki-da]     to   omot-te i    -ta. 
   Taro-TOP  Hanako-NOM sick-be-PRES that think-PROG-PAST 
    ‘Taro thinks that Hanako was sick (at that time).’ 
  b.  Taroo-wa [nanika               sakende-iru]            otoko-ni at-ta. 
   Taro-TOP [something(-acc) shout-PROG-PRES  man-to see-PAST 
    ‘Taro saw a man who was shouting something (at the time of seeing 
him)’ or 
    ‘Taro saw a man who is now shouting something’ 
 
For Schlenker, the reason that a sentence in the present tense can be interpreted in 
relation to the time of the matrix verb rather than in relation to the utterance time 
is that an attitude verb is a quantifier over contexts (i.e., a monster). However, in 
Japanese, tenses in relative clauses as well as verb complement clauses can be 
interpreted in relation to the matrix verb. This is shown in (11a, b). Ogihara 
(1996) contends that a Japanese sentence “in the present tense” is actually a 
tenseless sentence, and that this assumption allows us to account for data like 
(11a, b).
1 It seems then that to explain relative interpretations of indexicals in 
terms of quantification over contexts is a questionable move according to the 
Japanese data. 
 
 
3.  Attitudes and Agreement Phenomena 
 
Von Stechow (2003) argues for the view that some pronouns are subject to a 
“sequence-of-persons” rule, in that they can lose their (person, gender, number) 
features when some conditions are satisfied. The idea is to deal with the case of 
pronouns in a way analogous to the case of tenses. Just as it is natural to propose a 
sequence-of-tense rule to account for the English data, it is natural to employ a 
“sequence-of-persons rule” to account for some relevant data in the nominal 
domain. The major idea is that when one nominal locally c-commands a pronoun 
and they agree in person, number and gender, then the latter loses these features 
                                                 
1Technically, a tenseless sentence is encoded as a set of world-time pairs <w,t> such that the 
conditions specified by the sentence hold at t in w. To my knowledge, Stump (1985) was the first 
to posit the level of a tenseless sentence and to translate it into a temporal abstract (a set of times 
at which the conditions specified by the sentence obtain). This was needed to account for the 
behavior of tenses and temporal adverbials in English. 
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and become “plain variables”. This is true of normal bound variable cases like 
(12a), and that is also true of an exceptional case like (12b) (cited by Kratzer 
1998, who attributes it to Irene Heim). 
 
(12) a.  [Every  boy]1 thinks that he1 is the smartest. 
 b.  [Only  I]1 got the question that I1 understood. 
 
The idea is that pronouns often behave like “pure” variables and this is 
explained in terms of feature deletion. In cases like (12a, b), feature deletion 
occurs under identity, a concept very similar to tense (feature) deletion for the 
sequence-of-tense phenomena. This strategy is adopted by Kratzer (1998) and von 
Stechow (2003). This works very well to explain the behavior of so-called de se 
pronouns in English and some related languages (such as German). However, as 
far as “relative indexicals” such as ‘I’ in Amharic are concerned, this strategy 
necessitates an ad hoc rule such as the one in (13) adopted by von Stechow (2003) 
(attributed to Irene Heim 2001). 
 
(13)  The first person parameter: 
  Amharic verbal quantifiers delete the feature 1st of the person variable 
they bind, regardless of what their person checkee is. 
 
In my own proposal, I contend that alleged indexicals which receive relative 
interpretations in verb complement clauses are not indexicals but are pronouns 
with designated indices that must be bound. Intuitively, this means that the 
Amharic ‘I’ is parallel to the Japanese present in that it has no inherent utterance-
context orientation.  
 
 
4.  Felicity Conditions for Utterances 
 
As a first step toward a full-fledged proposal for attitudes, I adopt a truth 
conditional theory for natural language that incorporates speech act theory. Austin 
(1962) contends that an utterance of a sentence constitutes a speech act, and it is 
reasonable to assume that the very basic illocutionary speech act associated with 
an utterance of a natural language sentence is that of asserting or claiming. We 
can go one step further and assume with Grice (1975) that the speaker must have 
good reason to assert the content of the sentence. Thus, when someone utters a 
sentence in a way that satisfies Grice’s maxim of quality, we should regard this 
utterance event as a self-ascription of a relevant property by the speaker. Ogihara 
(1996: 62, 250) expresses this view in terms of a truth definition and accounts for 
the behavior of relative tense morphemes in Japanese. In this paper, I extend this 
approach to those indexical pronouns that receive relative interpretations. We 
then apply this approach to attitude reports. 
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The proposal defended here analyzes (14a) as in (14b). Taro’s speech act 
of uttering the sentence in question is reanalyzed as an illocutionary act of 
asserting and believing. This is then encoded in terms of self-ascription of a 
property by Taro. 
 
(14)  a.  Taro: Hanako-wa byooki-da. 
             Hanako-TOP sick-be-PRES 
    ‘Hanako is sick.’ 
  b. Taro self-ascribes at the utterance time in the actual world the 
following property: {<x,w,t> | Hanako is sick at t} 
 
We shall see below that this approach accounts for the relative interpretations of 
some alleged indexical pronouns.  
In order to obtain the semantics in (14b) in a compositional way, I propose 
the semantic rule in (15). I pretend here that we are dealing with an idealized 
relative indexical language that has a relative tense system (on a par with 
Japanese) and a relative indexical pronoun for the first person (on a par with 
Amharic). Since the language is exactly like Japanese regarding tense, there is no 
“relative present indicator” as such and the sentence itself is interpreted as a 
function of type <s, <i,t>> (s for worlds, i for time intervals, and t for truth 
values).
2 
 
(15)  Assumptions: A first person quasi-indexical (e.g., the Amharic ‘I’) bears 
the designated index <0, e>, which indicates the zeroth index of type e, 
  When the speaker α utters a sentence S at t0 in w0, the speech act is 
appropriate iff {<x,w,t> | <x,w,t> is a doxastic alternative of α at t0 in w0} 
⊆ {<x,w,t> | [[S]]gcx/<0,e>(w)(t) = 1} 
 (Note  that  gcx/<0,e> indicates that function exactly gc (assignment 
furnished by context c) except that it assigns x to <0, e>. See Heim and 
Kratzer (1998) for the notation as well as the necessary background 
information.) 
 
This proposal assumes that the “indexical” I is simply a pronoun that must have a 
special index that is mapped to a variable bound by the individual variable binder. 
Thus, the Amharic ‘I’ is not an indexical in the strict sense in my proposal. If the 
sentence has a second person pronoun you that behaves like a quasi-indexical, 
then it would be mapped to the person that is related to x via an acquaintance 
relation (Cresswell and von Stechow 1982). But this discussion would take us too 
far afield. So I will only discuss the case of the first person here.  
                                                 
2If there is a language that has an overt present tense morpheme that arguably indicates the 
position of “relative present”, then we could let the present tense morpheme bear the designated 
index <0, i> on a par with the Amharic ‘I’. 
 
164 Toshiyuki Ogihara 
So far, I have discussed those cases in which the object language 
expression in question has the form of a sentence. But given that a natural 
language utterance involves a self-ascription of a property by the speaker, we 
should pay attention to the fact that many natural language utterances constitute 
incomplete sentences. At least in Japanese, this is almost always the case. The 
idea that I shall pursue here is that an utterance of a property denoting expression 
(e.g., an intransitive verb without a subject nominal) is a norm rather than an 
exception. Faced with an example like (16a), the felicity condition for an 
utterance given above as (15) is slightly changed as in (16b). Consequently, (16a) 
receives the interpretation given in (16c). 
 
(16)  a.  Taroo-ni at-teiru yo. 
   Taro-dat  meet-PROG-PRES YO 
    ‘(I) am meeting Taro.’
3 
  b.  When the speaker α utters a predicate P at t0 in w0, the speech act is 
appropriate iff {<x,w,t> | <x,w,t> is a doxastic alternative of α at t0 in 
w0} ⊆ {<x,w,t> | [[ P]] gc(x)(w)(t) = 1} 
    (P is assumed to a function in D<e,<s,<t>>>) 
  c.  An utterance of (16a) by α at t0 in w0 is felicitous iff α self-ascribes 
the following property at t0 in w0: {<x,w,t> | x is meeting Taro at t in 
w} 
 
This straightforwardly captures the idea that uttering a sentence means self-
ascribing a property denoted by the expression uttered by the speaker. (17a) is a 
similar example, and (17b) provides the felicity condition for its utterance. 
 
(17)  a.  Soto-ni iru yo. 
    outside-at be-pres YO 
    ‘(I) am outside.’ 
  b.  The speaker self-ascribes the following property at t0 in w0: {<x, w, t> 
| x is outside at t in w} 
 
Thus, “incomplete sentences” in Japanese are in fact desired linguistic objects for 
semantic interpretation in this proposal.  
Needless to say, the entity that corresponds to a missing nominal position 
does not always correspond to the speaker. For example, in (18a) the empty 
category in Taro’s utterance indicates Jiro, rather than the speaker (i.e., Taro). In 
this case, the missing subject must be an empty referential pronoun and the 
context must furnish an appropriate individual as its referent as shown in (18b).  
                                                 
3The particle yo indicates (among other things) the speaker’s belief that the information 
conveyed by the sentence is important to the hearer. This is not absolutely necessary but makes 
the utterance natural. 
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(18)  a.  Hanako: Jiroo-wa ki-ta? 
                   Jiro-top come-past 
    ‘Did Jiro come?’ 
    Taro: Un, ki-ta yo. 
                    yes, (he) came. 
     ‘Yes, he did.’ 
  b.  Taro’s utterance at t0 in w0 is felicitous iff Taro self-ascribes at t0 in 
w0 the following property: {<x, w, t> | Joro comes at some time earlier 
than t in w} 
 
Thus, the empirical coverage of (16b) is limited. But it is nevertheless appealing 
to think of (16b) as the default rule for a hearer to use when she hears a 
“predicate”.
4 
 
 
5.  Proposal 
 
The proposal defended in this paper extends the idea of tenseless sentences to the 
nominal domain and encodes de se interpretations in terms of “personless 
sentences”. In the previous section, I discussed this idea at the matrix 
sentence/predicate level. Given that an utterance of any sentence is analyzed as 
self-ascription of a property, it is easy to adopt the same approach in dealing with 
attitude reports, to which I now turn. Schlenker does not adopt Lewis’s approach 
to attitude reports partly because there is no way of establishing a clear syntax-
semantics mapping relationship with this proposal. That is, a sentence is 
traditionally associated with a truth value (extension) or a proposition (intension), 
and not a property. A property is the intension of a one-place-predicate-like 
expression (like intransitive verbs, adjectives, and common nouns), not something 
associated with sentences. However, as shown in the previous section, Japanese 
utterances often consist of subjectless sentences (or one-place-predicate-like 
linguistic expressions). This is true of verb complements as well. Consider (19a), 
which is subject to the semantic rule in (19b) (analogous to 16b) and has the 
felicity condition given in (19c). 
 
(19)  a.  [siawase-da]-to dono hito-mo omot-te i-ru. 
   happy  PRES that which person also think-PROG-PRES 
   ‘Everyonei thinks that theyi are happy.’ 
  b.  A sentence of the form [Name Vt VP] is true at t1 in w1 iff {<x,w,t> | 
<x,w,t> is a doxastic alternative of [[Name]]gc at t1 in w1} ⊆ {<x,w,t> | 
[[ VP ]]gc(x)(w)(t) = 1} 
                                                 
4See Nakashima and Harada (1995) for a similar attempt within Situation Semantics. 
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    (P is assumed to a function in D<e,<s,<t>>>) 
  c.  An utterance of (19a) by α at t0 in w0 is felicitous iff {<x′,w′,t′> | 
<x′,w′,t′> is a doxastic alternative of α}  ⊆ {<x′,w′,t′> | For each 
person y, {<x,w,t> | <x,w,t> is a doxastic alternative of y at w′ in w′} 
⊆ {<x,w,t> | x is happy at t in w}} 
 
In (19a), the embedded clause already denotes a property. So Lewis’s idea about 
de se attitude reports works perfectly here as shown in (19b, c). 
When a sentence contains a complete clause as a verb complement as in 
the Amharic example (20a) (=5a), it is subject to the rule (20b) and receives the 
interpretation given in (20c). 
 
(20)  a.  john Jgna naNN yt-lall 
   John  hero  I-am   says-3rd sg.m 
    ‘John says that he is a hero.’ 
  b.  A sentence of the form [Name Vt S] is true at t1 in w1 iff {<x,w,t> | 
<x,w,t> is a doxastic alternative of [[ Name]]gc at t1 in w1} ⊆ {<x,w,t> | 
[[S]]gcx/<0,e>(w)(t) = 1} 
  c.  An utterance of (20a)) by α at t0 in w0 is felicitous iff {<x′,w′,t′> | 
<x′,w′,t′>  is a doxastic alternative of α} ⊆ {<x′,w′,t′> | {<x,w,t> | 
<x,w,t> is a doxastic alternative of John at t′ in w′} ⊆ {<x,w,t> | x is a 
hero at t in w}} 
 
Since the Amharic ‘I’ is analyzed as a plain variable with a designated index, it is 
bound by the individual variable binder and the embedded clause is interpreted as 
the property{<x,w,t> | x is a hero at t in w}}. Consequently, the ‘I’ receives a 
relative interpretation as desired.  
The Japanese first person pronouns (e.g., watasi, boku, ore, etc., which all 
refer to the first person) are only subject to true indexical (i.e., absolute) 
interpretations. But there are reasons to believe that the so-called reflexive (or 
logophoric) pronoun zibun is very much like the Amharic ‘I’. It is well know that 
the Japanese reflexive zibun can be used in a verb complement clause to indicate 
a de se interpretation as in (21a). In addition, at least in some dialects (including a 
semi-military dialect) zibun can also behave like a first person pronoun as shown 
in (21b). This means that these Japanese dialects are virtually equivalent to 
Amharic regarding the first person “indexical” (assuming that zibun can also be 
used in a verb complement clause for a de se interpretation in these dialects). 
Note also that in questions, zibun ‘self’ is often used to indicate the hearer. (21c) 
is acceptable in many dialects, including the standard Tokyo dialect. Since a 
question is a linguistic form that is designed to elicit information about the 
hearer’s attitudes, the fact that zibun can correspond to the hearer in (21c) makes 
sense. 
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(21)  a.  Dono gakusei-mo [zibun-ga itiban dekiru]-to omot-te i-ru. 
    which student-also [self-NOM most smart-PRES] that think-PROG-PRES 
   ‘Every  studenti thinks that hei is the smartest.’ 
 b.  zibun-wa daizyoobu-de arimasu. 
   self-TOP    fine-be-PRES 
   ‘ I am doing fine, sir.’ 
 c.  Zibun-wa doo-sitai-no? 
   self-TOP how-do-want-Q 
   ‘What  do  you want to do?’ 
 
Although the case of zibun is not completely parallel to the case of Amharic ‘I’, it 
provides further evidence for the viewpoint presented in this paper. 
Lastly, let me notes that the proposal being defended (which subsumes my 
earlier proposal in Ogihara 1996) is capable of accounting for the behavior of 
Japanese tense morphemes in relative clauses as well as in verb complements. 
Unlike Schlenker’s account, my proposal does not rely on the manipulation of 
contexts to get the right interpretation for “relative indexicals”. I also do not 
depend on the mechanism of feature deletion to obtain relative interpretations of 
the Amharic ‘I’, contra von Stechow (2003). Consider (22). 
 
(22)  [nanika(-o) saken-de i-ru]               otoko-o       mi-ta. 
 something-ACC shout-PROG-PRES person-ACC see-PAST 
  ‘(I) saw a man who was shouting something.’ 
 
The relative clause nanika(-o) saken-de i-ru ‘who is shouting something’ is in the 
“present tense” but since this is technically analyzed as a tenseless clause, the 
time of the event is not located at the utterance time. The clause thus denotes the 
set {<x, t, w> | x is shouting something at t in w}, whereas its modifiee otoko 
‘man’ denotes {<x, t, w> | x is a man at t in w}. These two sets are then 
intersected to yield the meaning of the object NP as a whole: {<x,t, w> | x is a 
man and is shouting something at t in w}. Since the NP is interpreted in relation 
to the time of seeing, we obtain the desired simultaneous interpretation. This is 
the view expressed in Ogihara (1996), and its ability to account for the 
“simultaneous reading” of relative clauses in the present tense is a clear advantage 
over its competition.
5 
This proposal accounts for the temporal properties of English infinitival 
clauses as well. English infinitival clauses can occur as verb complements as in 
                                                 
5There is a complication that I cannot address in this paper. By adding some appropriate 
adverbials, (22) could receive another interpretation in which the “present tense” denotes the 
utterance time. In Ogihara (1996) I suggest that this possibility would be accounted for via the 
rule of Quantifier Raising. However, as Kusumoto (2005) shows, the QR approach to the 
ambiguity may be problematic. For the purpose of this article, I simply ignore this problem and 
concentrate upon the simultaneous reading of the present tense in relative clauses. 
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(23a) or as a relative clause as in (23b). 
 
(23)  a.  John claimed to be innocent. 
  b.  I gave John a book for him to read. 
 
Since infinitival clauses are by definition tenseless, it seems straightforward to 
interpret (23a, b) as in (24a, b), respectively. 
 
(24)  a.  {<x,w,t> | x is innocent at t in w} 
  b.  {<x,w,t> | ‘he’ reads x at some time later than t in w} 
 
Note that the temporal interpretation specified in (24a, b) is not linked to the 
utterance time in any way. Thus in both cases, the time of the infinitival clause is 
understood to be simultaneous with the time of the matrix clause. The infinitive in 
(23b) requires a cautionary note since the time of his reading must follow the time 
of John’s giving the book. But this is because of the future-oriented reading 
associated with the infinitival to read, and the point is simply that this future time 
is calculated in relation to the matrix event time, not in relation to the utterance 
time. The data such as (23a, b) strengthen the argument for my proposal. Since 
infinitival clauses are tenseless, they contain no temporal indexicals. It seems that 
the lack of indexicals allows them to receive simultaneous readings in (23a, b). 
Since Japanese clauses in the “present tense” are also capable of producing the 
same range of interpretations, I contend that Japanese sentences in the “present 
tense” are also tenseless. 
Regarding the PRO subject in (23a), which only receives a de se reading 
(Chierchia 1989), we could argue that PRO is in fact not there; the “infinitive 
clause with a PRO subject” is actually a predicate. This idea would provide us 
with a desired linguistic expression for obtaining a property and allow us to 
predict that (23a) must receive a de se interpretation. 
 
(25)  Every man claimed to be happy with his job. 
 
Although this analysis might get us into trouble when potential bound variable 
pronouns occur within the infinitival clause as in (25), I believe this it is an idea 
worth pursuing.
6 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have defended the view that the semantics of attitude verbs can be 
described and explained within Lewis’s property-based approach. In so doing, I 
                                                 
6I thank Uli Sauerland for pointing out some potential problems with this view. 
Attitudes without Monsters 169 
ruled out Schlenker’s alternative approach according to which attitude verbs are 
quantifiers over contexts. My strategy is to look at the whole phenomena of 
attitude reports from the viewpoint of relative indexical languages. Regarding 
tense, I assume that Japanese has no indexical tenses, and so-called tensed 
sentences are actually tenseless. I pursue the same approach with Amharic 
sentences containing ‘I’. The idea is that they are “personless sentences” because 
the Amharic ‘I’ is not an indexical. It is a pronoun that must be bound by the 
individual variable binder. I extend this approach to cases where the linguistic 
expression being uttered has no overt subject. I believe that my proposal is 
empirically adequate and intuitively appealing, as far as “relative indexical” 
phenomena are concerned. 
It is clear that this is not the whole picture. Some European languages 
such as English and German might require morpho-syntactic operations (e.g., 
feature deletion) to afford the right empirical predictions. For this, we perhaps 
need a proposal like von Stechow (2003), which for the most part complements 
what I do in this paper. Despite the limited applicability of the proposal here, I do 
believe that it is of vital importance to present an analysis of the known data from 
a new perspective, especially a perspective of a non-European language, and I 
hope to have accomplished just that. 
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